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ABSTRACT
This study identifies the current status and intentions of
foreign-owned U.S. banks with respect to real estate lending in
the U.S. The study focuses on the construction mortgage lending
activities of Canadian and European banks.
As foreign-owned U.S. banks expand their real estate lending
operations, they must compete with domestic banks who have
previously dominated the market. Because real estate lending
relies heavily on market knowledge and long-term relationships,
it presents a formidable challenge to foreign-owned U.S. banks
who are relatively new to the market. The findings show that
foreign-owned U.S. banks involved in real estate lending suffer
from dependence on home offices for transaction approvals, lack
of market knowledge, and apprehension towards new real estate
markets.
This study concludes that foreign-owned U.S. banks wishing to
succesfully compete with domestic banks in the U.S. real estate
lending market must confront these issues.
Thesis Supervisor: Marc A. Louargand
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
Foreign-owned banks have developed a well-established
presence in the U.S. banking industry. Most foreign banks
initially came to the United States both to follow the
operations of home country clients who where expanding their
operations into the U.S., and to participate in U.S.
financial markets. As the banks expanded their operations
and became a competitive force in the banking industry, they
have ventured into lending activities, including real estate
lending, previously dominated by domestic banking
institutions.
Because real estate lending relies heavily on market
knowledge and long-term relationships, it presents a
formidable challenge to foreign-owned U.S. banks who are
relatively new to the domestic real estate market. While
foreign investment in general has attracted a great deal of
attention in recent years, little is understood about
foreign-owned U.S. banks who participate in, or intend to
participate in, U.S. real estate lending.
OBJECTIVE
This study identifies the current status and intentions
of several Canadian and European-owned banks operating in
the U.S., and analyzes the challenges they face as foreign
lenders involved in the U.S. real estate market. The
construction mortgage lending activities of these banks is
emphasized.
Canadian and European banks were surveyed for several
reasons. First, they provide an interesting contrast.
Canada is both economically and geographically intimate with
the United States. European countries, on the other hand,
are comparatively independent from the U.S. in terms of
location and home economy. Secondly, European and Canadian
banks account for seventeen of the thirty-eight largest
foreign-owned banks in the U.S. Although the largest of
these foreign-owned U.S. banks are Japanese, Japanese banks
are relatively new to the U.S. banking industry and have
only just recently begun to engage in construction mortgage
lending.
METHODOLOGY
To understand the objectives of foreign-owned U.S.
banks, we must first look at a brief general history of
foreign banking operations in the U.S. This material is
presented in Chapter One. The chapter explores three
themes: the effect changes in the U.S. regulatory
environment have had on foreign banks entering the U.S.
banking industry, a discussion of the current market share
of foreign-owned U.S. banks, and a review of the current
literature regarding future trends of foreign-owned U.S.
banks.
Chapter Two contains profiles of three Canadian and
four European banks involved in the U.S. construction
mortgage lending market. The various banks illustrate
different objectives and approaches of foreign-owned U.S.
banks in the areas of lending roles, asset criteria and
decision-making. This chapter also contrasts the banks'
U.S. operations and opportunities with those in the banks'
home countries.
The findings of this study are summarized in Chapter
Three. Based on this data, an attempt is made to project
the future role of foreign-owned U.S. banks as lenders in
the U.S. real estate market.
GENERAL HISTORY OF FOREIGN-OWNED U.S. BANKS
The first foreign banking offices in the United States
were established by the British, Canadian and Japanese in
the 1870's. These banks were established to give the home
banks greater access to the New York stock and bond markets,
to finance trade, and to facilitate the transfer of funds.
U.S. foreign bank activity declined during World War I and
the Great Depression, but was revived after World War II
when the U.S. dollar became the international medium of
exchange.1
It wasn't until the 1970's, however, that the U.S.
experienced significant increases both in the number of
foreign banking offices located in the U.S. and in the total
assets of these banks. This growth was encouraged by
congressional passage of the International Banking Act of
1978 (IBA). The IBA was written in response to allegations
by the U.S. banking industry that foreign-owned banks in the
U.S. were not as strictly regulated as domestic banks and
therefore enjoyed unfair competitive advantages related to
the cost of funds, multistate operations, and involvement in
non-banking activities.2 Most foreign-owned banks in the
U.S., for example, could engage in interstate banking
activities although domestic banks could not. In addition,
many foreign banks enjoyed cost savings because they were
not subject to federal reserve or insurance requirements.
The intent of the Act, therefore, was to place domestic and
U.S. foreign banks under equal regulatory requirements. It
represented the government's policy of promoting
nondiscrimination and competitive equality within the
U.S.banking industry.3
Until the IBA of 1978, foreign banks in the U.S. were
licensed and regulated according to state law. Most states
discouraged foreign bank branches and, as a result, the
opportunities for foreign banks were limited. In 1961,
however, New York state felt financially and politically
compelled to open the door to foreign-branch banking. New
York wanted to enhance its position as America's leading
financial center as well as bring foreign capital and
increased employment opportunities into the state. In
addition, many New York domestic banks were concerned that
their overseas branches would be penalized by foreign
governments in response to a lack of reciprocity.4 As shown
in figure 1, location of foreign banks, almost half of the
foreign bank offices in the U.S. today are located in New
York City.
FOREIGN BANK OPERATIONS
Many foreign banks currently operating in the U.S.
established U.S. agency banks in the 1970's to serve home-
country clients who were expanding their operations into the
U.S. Because agency banks are not authorized to accept
deposits, a cheap source of funds, many of these foreign
banks acquired or established branch offices in the U.S. to
compete more effectively in the U.S. banking market. Unlike
agency banks, branch offices have full banking privileges
and are therefore subject to the same restrictions as
similar U.S. banks. To establish branch offices, foreign
banks must meet U.S. regulatory requirements. European
banks incorporated this strategy in the 1970's and were
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especially aggressive in establishing branch banks. More
recently, Japanese banks have converted agency banks into
branches to develop their retail banking business and to
access cheaper funds.5 The recent expansion of both
European and Japanese banks into the U.S. has been
promulgated by the appreciation of their respective home
currencies. Canadian agency banks previously enjoyed the
largest foreign banking presence in the U.S. 6 However,
because until recently N.Y. state banks were prohibited from
opening branches in Canada, Canadian banks were limited to
agency form under N.Y. state reciprocity law and were
therefore unable to compete in size with the larger foreign
banks (for a summary of foreign bank organizational forms,
see Appendix A).
Most foreign banks have had difficulty entering the
retail market because of the high entrance costs and the
lack of a visible reputation in the U.S. The majority of
deposits in these banks are from the home country government
and businesses as well as ethnically related U.S. groups.
Foreign banks often act as a financing link for U.S and home
country trade as well as between the U.S. and third party
nations. The majority of foreign owned U.S. banks commit
over 50% of their loan portfolio to trade finance.7
This trend, however, is changing as foreign banks
continue to win over and extend credit to their domestic
clients. Foreign banks appeal to these clients for two
reasons. The first is financial soundness. In light of
recent problems the U.S. banking industry is experiencing,
not the least of which is the recent savings and loan
debacle, many company treasurers are worried about the
financial health of U.S. banks. Secondly, these customers
feel that foreign banks offer better value than domestic
institutions. In addition to competitive loan pricing,
foreign owned U.S. banks can offer their clients
international service and innovative international banking
methods. Pete Garrison of Greenwich Associates, a
Connecticut based market research firm says that
Foreigners have picked up credit business,
particularly from U.S. money center banks, which
have stopped fighting for low margin business
because they no longer want it. Many foreign
banks do want that business, partly because their
capital structure allows them to make a profit
where U.S. banks can't, partly because it enables
them to get a foot in the door.8
CURRENT MARKET SHARE
From June 1981 to June 1988, the dollar amount of
commercial and industrial (C&I) loan transactions by foreign
owned U.S. banks rose by 137%. This growth rate was more
than double that of domestic banks during the same period.
Foreign bank assets during this time increased 144%
compared to a 64% increase in domestic bank assets (table 1).
TABLE 1
GROWTH IN C&I LOANS, DEPOSITS, and ASSETS AT U.S. BANKS
Foreign Bank Owned U.S. Banks Compared with U.S. Owned
Banks from 6/30/82 to 6/30/88
(Dollar Amounts in Billions)
C&L Loans
June 30, 1988
Foreign
% of
Foreign U.S. total
$69.2
83.0
84.9
92.9
105.7
114.2
138.5
164.3
$276.3
303.7
311.0
360.0
378.6
402.0
419.5
433.9
20%
22%
21%
21%
22%
22%
25%
28%
Assets
June 30, 1988
Foreign
$261.6
285.4
321.6
380.9
423.8
461.0
571.9
638.3
U.S.
$1,474.9
1,569.3
1,681.4
1,734.6
1,883.3
2,050.7
2,158.5
2,289.2
Foreign
% of
total
15%
15%
16%
18%
18%
18%
21%
22%
Source: American Banker, March 1989
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
While the asset and C&I loan growth rates of these
foreign banks are greater than the growth rate of the U.S.
domestic banks, the absolute dollar amount of foreign bank
assets and C&I loans are small when compared to those of the
domestic banks. Total foreign-owned U.S. bank assets amount
to $638.3 billion dollars, or 27.9% of the $2.3 trillion
dollars of domestic bank assets. In the C&I lending market,
foreign banks currently hold a 27.5% share of the U.S.
market. The Japanese lead the foreign banks with a 13.9%
market share of the total U.S. lending market. They are
followed by United Kingdom and Canadian banks who have
market shares of 2.5% and 2.2%, respectively (figure 2).
Foreign-owned U.S. banks have a small foothold in the
U.S. mortgage market. For the first two quarters of fiscal
year 1988 foreign banks in the U.S. lent $1.98 billion
mortgage dollars. This amount is approximately 7% of the
$29.07 billion mortgage dollars that U.S. domestic banks
lent during the same period.9
CHALLENGES FACING FOREIGN OWNED U.S. BANKS
Foreign banks striving to compete succesfully with
larger, established domestic institutions in the U.S. real
estate lending market face three major issues. First, most
foreign banks are centralized, forcing the U.S. office to
rely heavily on the home office for investment approvals.
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Many of these banks, as a result, are unable to act quickly
enough to take advantage of various opportunities.
Secondly, both the foreign bank and the home office are
usually at a disadvantage to their domestic competitors in
regard to U.S industry and investment knowledge. Decisions
are often made by individuals who are not familiar with the
investment or its market. According to Kim and Miller,
"this lack of knowledge of U.S. industry and investment
opportunities may be one of the most serious problems that
foreign banks confront." Finally, many foreign owned U.S.
banks are perceived to have little involvement in the
communities where they do business.1 0
CHAPTER ONE END NOTES
1 Seung Kim and Stephen Miller, Competitive
Structure of the International Banking Industry, Lexington
Books, Lexington, MA, 1983, p. 25.
2 Staff of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Foreign Acquisition of U.S. Banks, 1981, p. 5.
3 Dana Khambata, The Practice of Multinational
Banking, Quorum Books, New York, 1986, p. 41.
4 Seung Kim and Stephen Miller, p. 36.
5 Ibid, pp. 31-32.
6 Ibid, p.33
7 Ibid, p.36.
8 "More U.S. Firms Using Foreign Banks: Study,"
American Banker, December 27, 1988.
9 Comptroller of the Currency, September 30, 1988.
10 Seung Kim and Stephen Miller, p. 167.
CHAPTER TWO
The previous chapter presented a general overview of
the activities of foreign-owned U.S. banks. Chapter Two
focuses on the lending activities of seven foreign-owned
U.S. banks, including each bank's lending role, asset
criteria and decision-making process. In the interest of
confidentiality, the names of the banks surveyed have been
changed. The names of the bank representatives interviewed
have also been omitted.
CANADIAN BANK ONE1
Seven years ago the current president of Canadian Bank
One moved to the U.S. to head the bank's U.S. operations.
He ". ..made a real commitment that this [Canadian Bank One]
was going to be a North American Bank." By 1988, the bank
was the fourth largest Canadian Bank in the U.S. in terms of
commercial and industrial loans outstanding and had eight
offices across the country.
Each office established a corporate banking unit
staffed by marketing officers. These officers were
primarily U.S. trained bankers who were familiar with the
regional market and who could bring their expertise to the
bank. Although these offices called on very large U.S.
developers and Fortune 500 companies, the emphasis was on
following Canadian developers, such as Cadillac Fairview and
Olympia & York, who were entering the U.S. market. In 1985,
the bank agented its first deal, a $325 million ten year
acquisition loan, with two other Canadian banks and several
domestic groups. The Canadian banks were forced to keep a
substantial portion of the loan in their own portfolios
because none of them had the contacts to "sell it down"
(sell the loan to participating banks - see Appendix B).
In 1986, the bank was an agent for a $545 million
project in Manhattan involving fourteen participating banks
and an American developer. Because one of the developer's
partners was concerned that Bank One was not a U.S. bank,
Manufacturer's Hanover was brought into the deal as co-
agent. "Today," remarks the Vice-President of Real Estate,
"I would be more adament about saying 'no, I would like to
syndicate on my own.' We have the administrative
capabilities to handle it as well as the contacts." The
vice-president attributes this confidence to experience and
exposure: ". . .We have a syndications capability that is now
more developed and we are more confident [that] ... our name
is recognizable because of some of the deals we have
agented. "
Canadian Bank One's portfolio is evenly split between
agent and participant deals. When the bank is the sole
agent of a deal and underwrites the entire loan, 25% of the
debt is kept in the bank's own portfolio and the remainder
is sold. By selling a portion of the debt, the bank can
make money on the skim (if a portion of the loan can be sold
at a fixed yield determined by prime to another bank, and
prime goes up up a quarter, the seller makes a quarter,
called the "skim", on the buyer's share). Keeping the asset
in the bank's portfolio is not considered by Bank One to be
as profitable. There are often situations, however, when
the bank has to keep 35% of the loan because the
participants want the agent at the table for a large amount
of the loan. The banker interviewed remarked that "...It
has been European banks that have pressured us more [to keep
a large percentage of the loan] than domestic banks."
Canadian One usually does not consider construction
loan proposals under $10 million. The bank does not,
however, have a ceiling on the amount it will lend: ". ..The
dollar figure is not a limit like some U.S. [domestic]
banks. We have done coagency deals.. .with four major banks,
three of which were Canadian, for $400 million - $500
million." The bank's average yield requirement is 100 basis
point over LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate). Exceptions
are made for development proposals with special
circumstances or from developers with whom the bank has had
a long standing relationship.
The bank is principally interested in preleased
commercial office buildings in major urban locations and
retail shopping malls in strong locations. Bank One has
participated in residential developments, but these have
been exceptions. The bank does not lend to industrial and
R&D projects because these types of projects are usually too
small given the staffing needed for them. The bank avoids
lending to speculative office buildings and only works with
top-tier developers. The vice-president explained that
The key is being close to developers. Not all
[developers]take a lot of risk, [there are] still
good deals out there. I'd like to do
predevelopment loans where we are very comfortable
with the location because this will give us an
entre into the construction loan. It is
speculative, but you have equity from the
developer and a good location so you are lending
on the value of land you know is there.
When asked about the bank's approach in analyzing
deals, the vice-president offered a comparison to the other
Canadian banks interviewed:
Canadian Bank Two believes the most important
thing to look at is the market and Canadian Bank
Three believes the most important thing to look at
is the customer - the market changes, the
economics of the deal change, but the customer
stays the same. We are somewhere in the middle.
We do a fair amount on the market, but the target
market is limited to the first tier. So we are
not quite as dependent on the [strength of] the
borrower as Bank Three or as refined in market
analysis as Bank Two who really look at things on
a micro level and have people quite knowledgeable
on some of the markets. If they get comfortable
with a market, Canadian Bank Two might go ahead
with the deal where we wouldn't.
The real estate department at Bank One is staffed
by two analysts who do the underwriting, supervision of
loans and who work with participants. The department is in
the process of hiring two more analysts. The bank uses
discounted cash flow models and sensitivity analysis to
analyze the loan proposals. These figures are compared to
an outside appraiser's evaluation of the project. The
financial models and accompanying written report are
extensive and include details of the construction budget
compared to the budgets of similar projects, the state of
the market, the project's strengths and weaknesses and a
summation of the compensation to the bank.
The loan approval limit for the U.S. office is
$15,000,000. The majority of transactions the bank is
involved in are greater than this amount, so a home office
signature is usually needed for loan approvals. The project
is often approved in the home office within one to two days
and the whole approvals process takes approximately two
weeks. The process is not as lengthy or involved in Canada
for Canadian development deals because it is a close-knit
community and the decision makers are probably familiar with
the developer and the market. The abilty to pass on
information verbally, in a centralized office, also helps
cut down on written documentation.
Opportunities for the bank lie in the fact that the
U.S. economy and real estate market is bigger than Canada's.
With many U.S. banks coming into the Canadian market, it
made sense for Bank One to enter the U.S. market to increase
profits. Another opportunity mentioned by the bank
representative interviewed is that the organization is much
smaller in the U.S. There is an opportunity, therefore, for
the representative to have more access to the senior people
in the bank as well as to the U.S. customers. In Canada,
the senior member of a bank would be socially connected with
the senior officer of a company and the two would deal with
each other directly.
A disadvantage the bank feels it must overcome in the
U.S. market is that the domestic banks have been close with
U.S. developers for years. The domestic banks "appear to be
more comfortable with risk than the Canadians. They will
therefore do land loan, predevelopment loan and unusual
deals for someone they know." Also, most domestic banks are
located in the same building and can get approvals in one
day. If they are comfortable with the market, they require
less analysis of the deal.
The vice-president added that Canadian Bank One should
follow the example of domestic banks and become more
involved in social and charitable functions. These
activities demonstrate good will and are important for
networking reasons. It is "a hard point" to make to the
home office.
CANADIAN BANK TWO 2
When the vice-president of Canadian Bank Two joined the
bank, the bank acted primarily as a participant in deals.
In the last three years, however, the bank has become
... large enough and arrogant enough, if you will,
that we want to lead our own transactions and
really refrain from participating with other
banks. We know enough and have good enough
contacts and connections that we want to
underwrite our own transactions and sell off to
other banks. We are now in the stage when some of
the New York money center banks buy from us.
Bank Two is currently the most active Canadian Bank in U.S.
real estate. It is also among the twenty largest foreign
banks in the U.S.
Bank Two originates deals in a variety of ways. The
bank has a list of prospects which it actively markets.
Because of its reputation in the marketplace, it is often
approached by developers and other lending institutions.
The bank considers City Bank to be its major competitor for
underwriting real estate deals.
The bank typically keeps 20% of the loan it underwrites
in its own portfolio. It is the sole underwriter for two-
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thirds of the deals in which it is a lender. The bank has a
policy of selling down its loans in order to free up lending
capacity, to promote risk diversification, and to enhance
return on the asset through the "skim."
Canadian Bank Two usually does not consider
construction loan proposals for less than $20,000,000. The
average size of the deals it has worked on during the last
two years is $100 million. "Canadian banks," according to
the vice-president, "have the reputation of underwriting
large projects. As opposed to a $20 million project they do
a $100 million project and take the whole underwriting risk
as opposed to having it syndicated beforehand." The bank's
target for return on assets is 100 basis points over LIBOR
after tax. Because of the significantly higher risk
involved in real estate lending, however, the internal
requirement for real estate assets is higher than the banks
average.
The bank lends primarily to office projects in central
business districts and regional shopping centers. It will
also lend to suburban office buildings, neighborhood
shopping centers and industrial parks. Ninety percent of
the portfolio is in commercial projects and the remaining
ten percent is in residential projects. Residential is
"...work intensive and we usually don't work with middle
25
market clients, just the top echelon developers and
institutions." Middle market clients are considered to be
anyone under $100 million net worth.
Up to this point, the bank has made a conscious
decision not to enter the middle market:
I have fifty accounts, five per officer, and they
are able to give a lot of attention to each
client. Going into the middle market will create
overhead and a higher risk profile.
But, as the top market becomes overbanked, the vice-
president believes that the bank will have to find a more
downscale market strategy.
Bank Two has a real estate staff of ten comprised of
analysts and account officers. The vice-president of the
real estate department takes a cursory look at the deals as
they come in to see if the deal makes sense and meets bank
policy. The deal is then handed to an account officer who
researches the project and market area, analyzes the
finances, performs sensitivity analysis, and then prepares a
written recommendation in conjunction with a team leader.
Cost consultants review the construction budget. If it is
either an exceptionally large project or a hotel, outside
consultants such as Pannell Kerr Forster or Laventhol and
Horwith are hired to look at the market. If approved by the
vice-president, the application goes to the credit
26
department for a counter signature. If above a certain
dollar limit (not available), the application must go to the
head U.S. office in Chicago and be approved by the vice-
president of credit. Over the vice-president of credit's
limit, the application must go to the home office in Canada.
The time needed for approvals takes from two weeks to
two months, depending on the projects size and complexity.
The system is one of checks and balances where two
signatures of equal authority are needed to keep the project
progressing through the pipeline. Consulting the home
office for projects which exceed the U.S. office approval
limit significantly increases the application processing
time. The approval process in Canada for Canadian deals is
the same as in the U.S. However, in Canada the deals take
less time to process.
What are the opportunities for Canadian Bank Two in the
U.S.? The real estate market in the U.S. is much larger
than the Canadian real estate market. There is room to gain
a competitive edge:
In Canada, you have five big banks covering 85% of
the market... so in one way or another, these banks
deal with the major developers in Canada. They go
much more into the middle market. Down here,
competition is not so transparent. Here you can
attract people with [by offering] expertise in the
marketplace. Up in Canada, everyone has expertise
in the marketplace. We can still outshine
Japanese banks, they have not yet come to that
27
kind of expert level, or European banks who are
just starting to come in.
In addition to the U.S. providing a larger market, the
bank's return on assets is greater in the U.S. than in
Canada.
A handicap on the bank's operations in the U.S. is that
the bank does not offer a full spectrum of banking services
as they do in Canada. In Canada the bank often provides
personal loans and mortgages to the president and
chairpeople of the companies they work with. Because the
U.S. bank offices do not have retail deposits, the bank must
rely on more expensive money market deposits for funding.
The future of the bank will be more fee driven than
interest rate driven. Because good deals are overbanked and
highly competitive, the bank will increasingly shift its
relationship with developers to that of an advisor: "Reserve
requirements and heavy competition by foreign banks squeeze
the margins on cost of funds and what your lending at... You
can't meet return on equity anymore by just lending."
CANADIAN BANK THREE 3
Canadian Bank Three is one of the largest Canadian
banks in the U.S. and among the twenty largest foreign owned
bank in the U.S. with eight offices throughout the country.
Until three years ago, it was strictly a participant in
deals. Today, the bank is an agent for 85% of its deals.
It is the sole underwriter for half of these.
Bank Three prefers to keep at least 50% of the deals it
underwrites in its own portfolio. Construction loan
proposals usually exceed $25 million and the bank's target
yield on these loans is 175 basis points over LIBOR.
The specific focus of the bank is wholesale banking.
Deals are actively marketed in areas that have been
researched by the bank. The bank considers only top-tier
developers with large projects in healthy markets. A
representative of the real estate department explains that
... [our] market is narrow and specific; the cream
of the market. It is easier than dealing with the
middle market. The market information is easier
to obtain, as is the developer's track record and
financial statements.
For these reasons, the representative feels it is much safer
to avoid the middle-market.
Office buildings make up 65% of the bank's debt
portfolio. The remainder of the portfolio includes retail
malls (20%), residential developments (10%) and industrial
developments (5%). The bank would like to do more smaller
deals involving industrial projects, but the small dollar
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size of these deals does not fit into the bank's wholesale
image. This wholesale image combined with a lack of a
branch network also prevents the bank from doing end
mortgages as is done in the bank's Canadian offices.
Loan proposals are analyzed in-house by a staff of
sixteen which includes team leaders, marketing
representatives and account officers. Assuming all the
information is available for a team to process the
application, approvals usually take ten to fifteen business
days. All proposals, accompanied by a formal written
presentation, must go to the home office in Toronto. This
process is identical to the process in Canada for Canadian
real estate deals.
The representative of the bank believes that because
Bank Three is a Canadian bank it has an advantage over other
foreign banks:
It is different... [we have] been here a long time
and we speak the same language. Decision makers
are in the same time zone and cultural differences
are minor. our long term opportunity in the U.S.
is relationship banking which requires good
services and communication...
FIRST EUROPEAN BANK4
First European Bank is stricly a participant in U.S.
real estate lending. Most of the deals come to the bank
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from agent banks with whom it has had established
relationships. The agent banks with which First European
participates in the majority of its deals are well-known
institutions such as Citicorp, Chase Manhattan and Chemical
Bank.
The real estate department of the bank is part of its
merchant banking section. The department is not a profit
center; its main purpose is to objectively analyze deals.
In addition to the real estate group's analysis, the credit,
portfolio and management departments all prepare small
summaries and recommendations. These reports are reviewed
by the five members of the Credit Committee in New York.
This review process usually takes two to three weeks. If
the loan request exceed $20,000,000, the home office must
be consulted. The approvals process in this case may take
up to a month. Says one banker, "[First European] would
take forever - they need to translate reports at the home
office. "5
The debt decisions at First European are based on the
current position of the bank's loan portfolio, the market
area of the project, the project's leasing status and on the
interest rate. The biggest weight is put on the sponsor's
(borrower's) reputation and net worth.
SECOND EUROPEAN BANK 6
Ten years ago, Second European Bank had offices in only
two locations; its home country and New York. At this time,
the bank did not do any real estate lending. Today, the
bank has offices in several countries, four in the U.S., and
is in the process of establishing a real estate department
in its New York City office. The bank invests primarily in
New York corporations and start up companies from the bank's
home country.
Originally, Second European would not get involved in
U.S. real estate deals. The vice-president interviewed
attributes the bank's wariness to a market crash in the
bank's home country during the late 1970's where, in some
cases, property values depreciated by as much as 33%. The
bank's current activity in U.S. real estate is limited
strictly to participatory lending.
The banks's current lending policies are very
conservative. Second European will only invest in
commercial buildings located in prime areas such as central
business districts and preleased office parks. The bank has
lent to a few residential projects, but considers these
deals to be exceptions. The banks target yield for real
estate is 85 basis point over LIBOR but, according to the
bank's representative,
...we want less [return] if we can take it for
less risk... we want to know what risks we are
taking and build those into our fees. Too many
banks know the developer and take risks based on
this relationship. They need to look at the
project.
Loan proposals originate through one of the bank's
lending groups. Most of the deals come from agent banks
looking for participants. Because the approval authority
limit for the New York office is $3,000,000, virtually all
deals require the approval of the home office in Europe.
The New York office is required to prepare short, informal
reports for the home office. According to one staff member,
the U.S. office must translate all credit reports before
they are sent to Europe. Reports, consequently, are
"...written on a sixth grade level. [Translating reports]
really holds up the process."7 The entire approvals process
usually takes two weeks.
The bank is currently in the process of setting up a
real estate department in its New York office. Explained
the bank's representative:
The exposure was not justified up to now... [we
have not been] knowledgeable and have been
learning about the market, what to invest in... the
U.S., however, has a bigger economy and a better
return on assets.
THIRD EUROPEAN BANK 8
Third European Bank has been in the United States for
ten years and is a relatively new bank in respect to real
estate. Third European's primary focus is lending to large
U.S corporations and subsidiaries of the home country and
other European companies. The bank underwrites deals
originated exclusively through the real estate group in
Third European Capital, a capital corporation related to its
parent company. It is also involved in a small number of
participations with other banks. From the bank's
perspective, real estate is less important than the
corporate business which is crucial to the institution's
global operations:
We look at real estate really as a secondary
priority for the branch, and so it is a small
section of our portfolio. It will grow because of
an increase in transactions in the real estate
area, but it will never [hold a significant
position. We are a provider of financial services
to industrial corporations, and that is how we are
structured world-wide.
Third European Capital is a separate legal entity from
Third European Bank. Because its focus is on real estate,
however, the two are often involved in transactions
together. Third European Bank will often provide
construction financing and initial short term and medium
term financing for deals that the capital corporation
originates. Once there is an opportunity to finance the
building at a low cost, European Capital will take out the
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loan and repay the bank.
As an example, the bank is currently working on a
multi-use project which is being underwritten by the capital
corporation for $533 million in the form of a convertible
debt issue. The bank is providing approximately $125
million in short-term and medium-term financing. The
capital corporation will then underwrite the term debt and
take out Third European's loans.
Third European Capital is primarily interested in deals
with leading national and regional developers. The
corporation invests in major office building with value in
excess of $100 million dollars and in a limited amount of
shopping malls. Ninety-percent of its portfolio is in
commercial buildings. It's principle objective is to invest
in a building when the building is in the conceptual stage
and is 30%-35% preleased with a viable design program. By
investing in buildings in the conceptual stage and assuming
development risk, the corporation seeks to earn a high
return: "[We] don't have a hard and fast number [for
return] ... we would normally not want to go into something
that does not provide a substantial upside potential."
The bank performs a close analysis of construction cost
figures to determine the feasibility of a project and hires
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a cost consultant to review the figures. The bank then
performs a market study and runs a proforma based on
estimated lease-up rates. A worst case lease-up scenario is
projected to analyze the effect a slow market would have on
the ability of the project to repay debt. Third European
Bank and the Third European Capital conduct separate
analyses. After completing their analyses, they meet and
compare their results and assumptions. Most of the loan
proposals must be approved by the bank's home office in
Europe. This requirement does not significantly increase
the amount of time needed for approvals. Analysis,
according to the bank's representative, is the most time-
consuming factor.
FOURTH EUROPEAN BANK.
At the end of 1988, Fourth European Bank was ranked
among the thirty largest foreign banks in the United States
and among the ten largest European banks in the U.S. in
terms of commercial and industrial loans outstanding. There
are thirteen Fourth European offices throughout the country.
The bank is a participant in 75% of the deals in which
it is a lender. The remaining 25% of the loans in which it
acts as an agent bank are kept in the bank's loan portfolio
and not sold down. Deals are originated through agent
banks, brokers, contacts and existing customers.
Most of the bank's loan portfolio is in residential
multi-family properties. The bank also invests in
commercial and retail shopping buildings. The deals the
bank considers range from $5 million to $20 million in size
and on average yield 150 basis points over their cost of
funds. The New York office is autonomous from the home
office; the representative of the bank does not talk to the
home office.
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CHAPTER THREE
FINDINGS
This study shows that foreign-owned U.S. banks wishing
to succesfully compete with domestic banks in the U.S. real
estate lending market must confront a variety of issues.
These issues are: dependence on the home office for
transaction approvals, lack of market knowledge, and
apprehension towards new real estate markets. These issues
are often related and are a function of two factors. The
first factor is the amount of experience and confidence a
foreign bank has as a lender in the U.S. real estate market.
The second factor is the banks' objectives.
Kim and Miller cite an overly centralized decision
making process to be a major issue facing foreign-owned U.S.
banks:
... [it is] quite common for major decisions of
foreign bank branches in the U.S. to be made by
home office top management.. .banking philosophy
and policies are influenced greatly by parent
banks. 1
The authors also characterize foreign-owned U.S. banks as
having insufficient knowledge of U.S. industry and
investment. This study shows that both these issues exist
for foreign-owned U.S. banks involved in the U.S. real
estate lending market. These issues are particularly acute
for foreign lenders because succesful lending relies heavily
on market knowledge. The combination of these factors often
results in a time consuming approvals process. Lengthy
project feasibility studies and market reports are often
generated to help the foreign bank to become comfortable
with lending in an unfamiliar market. This information must
often be translated for and analyzed by the home office
before a decision is made.
TABLE 2
U.S. OFFICE APPROVAL LIMITS AND PROCESSING TIME
U.S. office Processing time
Bank Approval limit w/home approval
Canadian Bank One $15,000,000 14 days
Canadian Bank Two not available 14-60 days
Canadian Bank Three $0 10-15 days
First European Bank $20,000,000 14-30 days
Second European Bank $3,000,000 14 days
Third European Bank $0 not available
Fourth European Bank no limit not applicable
As table 2 illustrates, there seems to be little
correlation among the foreign-owned U.S. banks surveyed
regarding U.S. office approval limits and the processing
time needed when home office approval is required. The
banks with a relatively high U.S. office approval limit do
not process applications any faster than the other foreign
banks. The approval limits for these banks, however, are in
most cases very close to or lower than their preferred loan
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amounts. When compared to U.S. domestic banks which
typically take seven to fourteen business days to approve a
construction mortgage loan application, however, the process
for foreign banks is more time and resource consuming. This
is a competitive disadvantage for the foreign-owned U.S.
banks who are unable to offer clients approvals in a short
amount of time.
In many domestic banks, an application can be processed
in a matter of days because it can be walked through the
central office. The real estate approvals process for
Canadian Bank Two is considerably shorter for the bank's
home office in Canada because the entire approvals process
can take place under one roof and the reports can be
verbally presented. Two of the European banks interviewed,
First European Bank and Second European Bank, are required
to translate written reports into the home office's language
before the reports are sent to and reviewed by the home
office. This requirement lengthens the approvals process:
[First European] would take forever - they need to
translate reports at the home office.2
[Reports are] written on a sixth grade level.
[Translating reports] really holds up the
process.3
Extensive analysis and lengthy formal reports also
lengthen the approvals process and, in addition, are a drain
on human resources. These types of reports are often
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required by foreign-owned U.S. lenders because they are
unfamiliar with the U.S. real estate market. This is
particularly true at the home office where the decision to
lend is made. Many of the bank representatives interviewed
commented that the approvals process at the home office for
home country real estate is considerably shorter than that
of the U.S. office because decision makers are familiar with
the home market.
The predominant lending role a foreign bank plays in
the U.S. construction mortgage market, as an agent or as
participant, is an indicator of the bank's level of
involvement in the market. Because agent banks underwrite
debt and assume most of the risks associated with
underwriting, they are required to be sophisticated and
experienced lenders. For each bank surveyed, table 3 below
shows the percentage of the bank's construction mortgage
loans in which the bank is an agent and a participant.
TABLE 3
LENDER'S ROLE: AGENT OR PARTICIPANT
Agent Participant
Bank (% of deals) (% of deals)
Canadian Bank One 50% 50%
Canadian Bank Two 95% 5%
Canadian Bank Three 85% 15%
First European Bank --- 100%
Second European Bank 1% 99%
Third European Bank not available not available
Fourth European Bank 25% 75%
As table three illustrates, the Canadian banks surveyed
are much more active as agents than are the European banks.
All three of the Canadian banks have become primarily agent
banks within the last five years. The representatives from
Canadian Banks One and Two each mentioned that their bank's
transition from participant to agent bank was made once the
bank felt it had enough experience in the real estate
lending market. The representative from Canadian Bank Two
said the following:
We know enough and have good enough contacts and
connections that we want to underwrite our own
transactions... 4
Second European Bank waited until it was comfortable with
its knowledge of the real estate market before beginning to
establish a real estate department:
The exposure was not justified up to now... [we
havn't been] knowledgeable and have been learning
about the market, what to invest in... 5
The second factor affecting lending activities is the
bank's objectives. Third European Bank concentrates on its
role as a provider of financial services to industrial
corporations. The bank's real estate activities are
virtually limited to transactions with its related capital
corporation; it rarely becomes involved with other
institutions and does want to pursue a significant position
in real estate.
First and Fourth European Banks are both participant
banks. Neither of the banks' representatives would reveal
their respective bank's future intentions with regard to
participating in or agenting transactions. However, because
First European Bank has been a participant in 100% of its
real estate deals (table 2), it probably will not focus on
agenting transactions in the near future. Fourth European
Bank, by contrast, is a relatively large foreign-owned U.S.
bank that has agented 25% of its real estate transactions.
The bank may have the desire and experience to expand its
activities as an agent bank.
All of the foreign banks surveyed, with the exception
of Fourth European Bank, specifically mentioned that they
lend to only.top-tier developers in healthy well-established
markets. These types of deals are becoming more scarce,
however, and many of the bankers felt that their banks might
be forced to venture into the middle market in the future.
Many of the banks interviewed were hesitant to enter the
middle market because of increased staff overhead and risk.
According to Canadian Bank Two's representative:
[Residential is] work intensive and we usually
don't work with middle market clients, just the
top echelon developers.. .Going into the middle
market will create [staff] overhead and a higher
risk profile. 6
Likewise, the representative of Canadian Bank Three had this
to say:
... [our] market is.. .the cream of the market. It
is easier than dealing with the middle market.
The market information is easier to obtain, as is
the developer's track record and financial
statements. 7
Because middle market lending is riskier than lending
to top-tier projects, it becomes even more important that
foreign banks expanding into the middle market have the
capacity to make well-informed decisions. By increasing
U.S. office approval limits and autonomy from the home
office, U.S. office staff could redirect their efforts
towards a more efficient approvals process in which
decisions are made by U.S. office staff familiar with the
particular market and project.
Kim and Miller argue that a third major issue
confronting foreign-owned U.S. banks is that the "foreign
banks are not percieved as social or civic conscious as U.S.
banks within the regions in which they operate." Although
substantiating this claim is not within the scope of this
paper, the banker interviewed at Canadian Bank One, pointed
to this issue as being often overlooked by Bank One and by
foreign banks in general. Domestic banks are usually well-
versed at projecting a socially conscious image and
providing services and contributing funds to community
organizations and projects. Perhaps the fact that none of
the other foreign bank representatives interviewed raised
this issue is indicative of a lack of awareness by the
banks.
What foreign-owned U.S. banks are aware of, however, is
that the U.S. real estate market offers opportunity for
growth and a relatively high return on assets. Foreign-
owned banks operating in the United States which intend to
expand their real estate lending activities will learn to
respond to the challenges of operating in the domestic
market, allowing them to increase their competitive efforts
and therefore capture a greater share of the U.S. real
estate lending market.
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APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF FOREIGN BANKS
The organizational structure of a foreign bank operating in
the United States is a function of the type of business the bank
is involved in, as well as the regulatory and legal differences
among the different forms. There are five organizational forms:
representative offices, agencies, branches, subsidiary banks, and
investment companies.
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES
Representative offices are not legally authorized to engage
in banking activities such as deposit-taking and financing.
These offices are usually set up in the U.S. by the parent bank
to perform the groundwork, such as researching a new market or
working with the regulatory agencies, necessary for establishing
a formal office. Banking transactions are performed through a
correspondent bank.
AGENCIES
Agencies are low-overhead entities that engage only in
wholesale international commercial banking. They are allowed to
extend commercial and industrial loans and to finance
international transactions. Agencies are not legally authorized,
however, to accept deposits, sell Certificates of Deposits, or to
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perform trust functions. Agencies are not subject to regulations
dictating maximum loan limits and are therefore able to make
larger loans than branches. Most agencies are fiscal agents for
their home countries and finance trade for their home office
clients.
BRANCHES
Branches enjoy full banking privileges and are subject to
restrictions similar to those regulating U.S. domestic banks.
Branches are subject to a maximum loan limit based on the parent
bank's capital and surplus. Most branches are involved in
international financing and wholesale banking. They usually do
not compete with domestic banks for retail business. Unlike a
subsidiary, the parent bank can control the operations of a
branch without establishing a separate board of directors.
SUBSIDIARY BANKS
Subsidiaries are separate legal entities from their parent
banks. They operate under the same restrictions as U.S. banks
and are able to engage in the full range of banking activities.
Most subsidiaries actively solicit domestic deposits and make
loans to area businesses and individuals.
Source: Competitive Structure of the International Banking
Industry, pp.36-38.
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APPENDIX B
A NOTE ON CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE LENDING
A construction mortgage lender in the U.S. gives out
short-term loans to fund the development construction costs.
The lender disburses funds as construction advances. These
disbursements are often called "advances" or "draws." Draws
are usually made by the bank according to a predetermined
schedule of items completed or percentage completed. The
bank disburses the funds after the bank, or a consultant
representing the bank, has made an inspection of the work
completed and determined that the developer has
satisfactorily met the requirements for the scheduled draw.
The term of the loan usually depends on the amount of
time needed for construction and can vary from four months
to five years. The interest rate on the loan can be fixed
or it can be variable and dependent on a prime rate.
Construction mortgage lending has the highest degree of
risk in mortgage lending. The advantages of construction
mortgage lending include a higher return than other types of
mortgage lending, a shorter term loan and the opportunity
for the lender to offer other services.
Construction mortgage loans originate from a wide
variety of sources such as developers, real estate and
mortgage brokers and attorneys. Another important source of
construction mortgage loans is other lenders. In this case,
a lead bank, known as the agent bank, will take the
initiative of finding a deal and will assume the risks
associated with underwriting. The agent bank will then
"sell down" a portion of the loan to other banks, called
participating banks or participants, to spread the risk.
A construction lender, whether a participant or an
agent, must determine the desirability of a loan in relation
to the bank's particular criteria. In determining if the
bank should proceed with financing, most institutions
conduct project feasibility studies which include a market
study and financial analysis in one form or another. Other
considerations include the reputation and track record of
the developer, the loan amount and fees. Very often
consultants are hired by the lender to conduct these studies
and submit them to the bank or to first compare them with
the lender's own research.
Virtually all construction mortgage lenders require the
developer to have takeout financing. Takeout financing is a
commitment from a lender to provide permanent financing
following the completion of construction. The takeout
commitment can be from the construction mortgage lender or
from a separate lending institution.
Source: The Banker's Handbook, pp. 703-711.
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